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Transmission in Transition:
Analyzing California's Proposed Electricity
Transmission Regulatory Reforms
BRIAN ORION*

INTRODUCTION

California is an energy policy maverick, and has been for a
generation.' In the seventies, the state adopted the radical notion that it
could avoid building new power plants by simply using less electricity
Conservation was supplemented by massive investments in renewable
energy, making California the global leader in wind power.' In the
eighties, California aggressively implemented the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), which encouraged states to
decentralize electricity generation, resulting in a whopping 15,000
Megawatts (MW) of new electricity from small non-utility generators
from 1983-1985, enough to power millions of homes.' And the story of
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005. My sincere
thanks to Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat for his helpful input, to the members of the Hastings Law
Journal for their hard work, and of course, to my mother and father for their commitment to my
success.
I. Timothy P. Duane, Regulation's Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19
YALE J. ON REG. 471, 482 (2002) (stating that California's approach to electricity regulation during the
i9"os and i98os "constituted a complete challenge to the dominant regulatory paradigm of the time");
Matthew C. Hoffman, The Future of Electricity Provisions, REGULATION, Summer 1998, at i ("For
better or for worse, California often has been the wave of the future."), available at
httpi/www.cato.orglpubs/regulation/regvi7n3/regi7n3-hoffman.html.
2. Duane, supra note I, at 483. Today we have come full circle as once again dominant voices
deny the benefits of conservation. See Joseph Kahn, Cheney Promotes Increasing Supply As Energy
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May I, 2001, at At (quoting Vice President Dick Cheney who, in defending his
National Energy Plan, stated that conservation may be a sign of "personal virtue," but is not an energy
policy).
3. John Lehrer, Winds of Change: Will CaliforniaReclaim Its Role as a World Leader in Wind
Energy?, WESTWAYS MAGAZINE, May-June 2002, at 67-73 (discussing how generous federal and state
tax incentives in the I98os led California to be the world's leader in wind production, accounting for 95
percent of global wind capacity by 1987); see John A. Wetenkamp, Power and Public Utilities: Chapter
12: Expedited Power Plant Siting as Response to Power Crisis, 33 McGEORGE L. Rav. 414, 416, 417 &
n.29 (2002) (stating that California led the nation in "green energy" during the ig7os).
4. Duane, supra note I, at 485-86; see Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 26oI2645 (2oo).
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the nineties is probably the best known of them all, with California
undertaking what was "the most radical electricity reform attempted to
date in this country."5 In 1996 the California Legislature passed AB 189o,
which deregulated the State's energy system.6 The promise was
compelling: competition among generators of electricity would bring
lower costs and greater investments in the state's energy infrastructure.
The reality turned out to be starkly different: Deregulation led to
widespread blackouts in early 2ooi, forced the state into signing costly
long-term energy contracts, and cost consumers billions. And it has left
another legacy that threatens to add to California's cost.
Deregulation is still having a dramatic, but often little-noticed
impact on California's system of high-power transmission lines.
Transmission is one of the three basic parts of an electricity system (the
other two are generation and local distribution).7 Transmission lines
transport power long distances from the power plant to cities and towns,
which is essential because energy is often generated far from where it is
consumed. Before deregulation, new lines were planned and permitted
by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). But deregulation
created a new organization called the California Independent System
Operator (ISO) charged with ensuring transmission reliability, yet failed
to remove the CPUC's permitting power. As a result, both agencies
review new transmission plans and they often disagree over when a new
project is needed. This regulatory redundancy threatens the backbone of
the electricity system by delaying or preventing new transmission
projects. California's system is aging, and new investments are needed.
A well-planned and robust transmission system ensures a variety of
benefits: it helps the electricity system run reliably, preserves natural
resources, and saves billions of dollars-all critical to energy security.8
But gaps in the system prove costly. During the California energy crisis,
transmission bottlenecks along the single set of power lines that allow
electricity to be transmitted between northern and southern California
jeopardized security by preventing available power in the south from
reaching desperate consumers in the north.9 These problems on the grid
continue to threaten the state's energy future. For example, on May 3,
5. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Institutions and Long Term Planning: Lessons from the California
Electricity Crisis, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 1O (2003); see Paul L. Joskow, California'sElectricity Crisis,
17 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL'Y 365, 367 (200!), available at http://oxrep.oupjournals.org/cgi
reprint/I7/3/365.pdf.
6. Public Utilities-Electrical Restructuring, A.B. 189o, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995), 1996

Cal. Stat. 854.
7. Bhagwat, supra note 5,at 97-98; Wetenkamp, supra note 3, at 416.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, 2003 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT 6-7 (2003) [hereinafter
CONSORTIUM OF ELEC. RELIABILITY TECH. SOLUTIONS, PLANNING FOR CALIFORNIA'S FUTURE
TRANSMISSION GRID, CONSULTANT REPORT 3 (2003) [hereinafter CONSULTANT REPORT].
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the ISO declared a "transmission emergency" and asked large
businesses to voluntarily curtail power use to avoid blackouts." Once
again, the problem was not a lack of power, but rather transmission
constraints which prevented the state from delivering available power to
where it was needed." Rolling blackouts could recur as soon as 2006,
especially if new power plants come online without sufficient
transmission upgrades.'"
Critics allege that the state's energy agencies kill important new
projects through redundant jurisdiction, fail to adequately assess the
impact of new transmission lines in competitive markets, and act as
islands rather than coordinating their planning processes. 3 Such
criticisms have attracted the attention of policy-makers, and currently the
state is considering two very different proposals to fix the transmission
regulatory system. The first proposal, coming from the Strategic Planning
Division of the CPUC, would create an agreed-upon methodology for
determining when a new transmission line is needed, and then erase
some regulatory redundancy by taking away from the CPUC the
responsibility for determining need and giving this job to the ISO. A
competing proposal comes from the California Energy Commission
(CEC), the agency responsible for licensing new power plants, and
strives to achieve better agency coordination by giving the CEC power to
license new transmission lines. These proposals require official action,
either legislative or executive, before becoming final. They are still being
refined at the planning stage and a decision is likely in 2005.
As the state begins debate on what would be the most substantial
change to the regulatory structure of its transmission system in a
generation, the policy-making bodies lack the institutional background
and history that may be critical in correctly implementing new changes to
the system.
Questions of transmission policy have received relatively little
attention in regulatory debates. 4 First of all, transmission is a natural
2004

iO.Mark Martin, Crunch in Energy Use in Southern California, S.F. CHRON., May 4, 2004, at B3.
i1.Id. (quoting grid operator as saying that the state had enough power, "[i]t just wasn't in the
right place"); see Arthur O'Donnell, A Long Hot Summer: California'selectricity supply, transmission
problems have power executives beginning to sweat, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 16, 2004, at GI
("Unlike the repeated blackout events of the 2ooi crisis, the worry is less about power availability than
about power deliverability. Continuing constraints on transmission lines within and between utility
territories pose the most serious risk to smooth operations.").
12. Editorial, Heat Is on Power Politics, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2004, at B12 (discussing California's
potential transmission problems and the possibility of rolling blackouts by 2oo6 if not sooner); Michael
A. Yuffee, California'sElectricity Crisis: How Best to Respond to the "Perfect Storm" 22 ENERGY L.J.
65, 68 (2ooi) ("California's transmission system is over taxed. In order to meet growing demand and
the hoped-for increase in new generation supply, California must upgrade its transmission system.").
13. See infra Part III.
14. See William A. Borders. Note, Learning from the Storm: Lessons for Illinois Following
California'sExperience with Electricity Restructuring,77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 333,351-54, 356-66 (2001).
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monopoly, meaning that it makes more sense for all generators to share
one set of transmission lines than for each generator to build its own
duplicate lines. 5 As a natural monopoly incapable of competition,
transmission will likely always remain regulated even when generation is
deregulated, as it was in California. I6 So transmission is sidelined in
deregulation discussions.
Second, transmission poses significant technical challenges.
Electricity is different than other commodities because it cannot be
stored in quantity for long, and therefore must be produced, sold, and
consumed almost simultaneously. 7 The ISO was created because running
a transmission system requires a central controller to balance system
supply and demand all the time. Managing the grid is complicated by the
fact that once electrons enter the power lines their direction cannot be
controlled externally-they will travel along the path of least physical
resistance. This makes central coordination imperative and partly
explains why transmission is such a complex issue. 9
Third, the institutional regulatory structure governing the
transmission system is complicated." You have three different state
agencies (the CPUC, CEC, and ISO), a few regional bodies, numerous
local jurisdictions, and one federal agency (the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, or FERC), all with overlapping jurisdiction
over transmission planning and licensing." Struggling to untangle this
knot is challenging.
Last, regulatory policy in general is steeped in hazy assumptions.
Looking back on the heady days of the deregulation debate in California,
people were blinded by the allure of markets and failed to imagine that
electricity might be different than airlines, telecommunications, trucking,
and other deregulated industries." Deregulation debates were driven

15. See Paul L. Joskow, Introducing Competition into Regulated Network Industries: From
Hierarchiesto Markets in Electricity, in FIRMS, MARKETS, AND HIERARCHIES: THE TRANSACTION COST
ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 237, 254 (Glenn R. Carroll & David J. Teece eds., 1999).
16. Id. at 255 ("the transmission network and its operation will be subject to continuing
regulation").
17. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 98; see Borders, supra note 14, at 335.
I8. See Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 9 8; ENERGY INFO. AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ELECTRICITY
TRANSMISSION FACT SHEET, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/fact_sheets/transmission
.html (last modified Aug. 19, 2003).
19. See Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 98 (discussing the need for central coordination in transmission
systems).
20. See infra Part II (discussing the overall transmission regulatory framework).
21. Id.
22. See Christopher G. Bond, Note, Shedding New Light on the Economics of Electric
Restructuring:Are Retail Markets for Electricity the Answer to Rising Energy Costs?, 33 CONN. L. REV.
1311, 1311 (2ooi) (linking deregulation of the airlines and long-distance telephone industries with calls
for change in electricity regulation); Duane, supranote I, at 489-90.
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more by ideology than by thoughtful economic analysis. 3 Yet despite this
realization, over ten years after the CPUC first began considering
deregulating,24 California still lacks a political dialogue capable of
rebutting unfounded fears of regulation and boilerplate notions of the
power of markets.
This Note strikes at all these problems as it addresses the two
proposals currently being considered to overhaul the transmission
regulatory system. Part I seeks to broaden understanding of the physical
and technological aspects of transmission by providing an overview of
California's transmission infrastructure. Along the way this Part
highlights some of the impressive strategic benefits of a robust
transmission system and shows that transmission investments can
accomplish things that generation and conservation cannot. Part II
introduces California's byzantine regulatory structure by providing a
thumbnail description of the key regulatory agencies and their functions,
followed in Part III by criticisms of this regulatory structure.
Part IV details four factors to help weigh the reform proposals:
reliability, rate stability, economic efficiency, and fairness. The first three
factors are what Professor Timothy P. Duane calls "the three policy goals
of the [electricity] regulatory regime," while fairness interjects an
important element of social justice into the debate by drawing on the
work of the Environmental Justice movement. Finally, Part V shows how
these factors can add texture to regulatory policy discourse by applying
them to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of both proposals to
restructure the transmission regulatory system. Drawing on this analysis,
the Note concludes that neither proposal furthers all four policy goals,
but that the CEC's proposal is better because it furthers reliability, rate
stability, and fairness, with at most a minor decrease in efficiency. By
employing this rational framework, California may lose its status as an
energy policy maverick. But maybe that would not be so bad after all.
I.

INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION IN CALIFORNIA

A. PHYSICAL COMPONENTS OF CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION
SYSTEM

In general terms, "transmission" refers to the transportation of bulk
electricity along a network of power lines. 5 These power lines are made
23. Joskow, supra note 5, at 370; see Bond, supra note 22, at 1313 ("[Wle should look past the
political fads that favor retail [electricity] markets.").
24. See Joskow, supra note 5, at 367-68 (stating that the CPUC began looking into deregulation

in 1993).
25. ENERGY DIcTIONARY, at http://www.energyvortex.com/frameset.cfm?source=/energydictionary

/energyvortex.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2004) (defining the term "transmission"). "Bulk" transmission
lines carry electricity from power plants to the outskirts of the city where it will be used. From there
the system is no longer "bulk," but instead is called a local distribution system. Id.; see CONSULTANT
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of copper or aluminum wire,26 usually about one inch in diameter, 7
strung along steel towers or buried underground. The steel towers
supporting these lines stand anywhere from 6o feet to I4 8 feet tall and
usually carry three or six copper or aluminum wires. One large
transmission line may be enough to serve the electricity needs of a large
city, but usually large cities require several transmission lines for reliable
service." Transmission lines in California are owned by the investor
owned utilities (IOUs) or municipal utilities, and remain so even after
deregulation."
Transmission lines vary in the amount of electricity they can carry."
In California, a transmission line is defined as a line that is designed to
operate at or above 200,000 volts (200 kilovolts, or kV).32 Most lines
operate close to this level, but voltages up to about 750 kV are
technically possible.33 When a transmission line reaches the outskirts of a
city it links to the local distribution system to deliver the power to the
end consumer. Distribution lines carry less than 50 kV and are subject to
different regulatory licensing processes.'
Transmission lines exist to move power.35 If electricity were
REPORT, supra note 9,at 6.
26. ENERGY DICTIONARY, at http://www.energyvortex.com/frameset.cfm?source=/energydictionary
/energyvortex.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
27. WIS. PUB. SERV. COMM'N, ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION LINES 3 (200i), available athttp://psc.wi.gov/

consumerbrochuredocument/electric6005b.pdf. (last modified Sept. i, 2004) [hereinafter ELECTRIC
TRANSMISSION LINES].

28. Id.at 3-4. Sometimes an additional non-conducting wire is strung above the others to protect
them from lighting strikes. Id.at 3.
29. Id.at 3.
30. Joskow, supra note 5,at 371; see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(f) (2oo4) ("The delivery of
electricity over transmission and distribution systems is currently regulated, and will continue to be
regulated to ensure system safety, reliability, environmental protection, and fair access for all market
participants.").
31. Whether a given metal wire is classified a "transmission" line instead of a different type of

line, like a "distribution" line, is not predestined. For purposes of definition, California distinguishes
between three categories of lines: A "transmission" line is one that can carry 2oo kV or more; a
"power" line is a line carrying between 50 and 200 kV; and finally, a "distribution" line is one designed
to carry 5o kV or less. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N GENERAL ORDER 131-D § I (adopted June 8, 1994,
effective July 8, 1994) [hereinafter GO I 3 i-D]. While this definition is logical, other definitions are
used elsewhere. See, e.g.,
ENERGY DICTIONARY, at http://www.energyvortex.com/frameset.cfm?
source=/energydictionary/energyvortex.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2004) (defining "transmission voltage"
as any voltage above 69 kV). Nevertheless, the definition has great practical importance because
transmission and power lines are subject to different regulatory licensing processes than distribution
lines. See infra Part II.B.I.
32. GO I3i-D § I. Transmission capacity is usually expressed not in volts, but in thousands of
volts, or kilovolts (kV). Thus, i,ooo volts = one kV.
33. ENERGY DICTIONARY, at http://www.energyvortex.comlframeset.cfm?source=/energydictionary
/energyvortex.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
34. GO 131-D § I. For a discussion of the licensing process for transmission lines, see infra Part II.
35. See CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9,at 3 ("California's transmission grid is designed to
reliably move power within the state and deliver it to consumers." (emphasis added)); EDISON ELEC.
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generated in the same place it was used, no transmission lines would be
needed. But, because power plants are often located far away from cities
and towns, some way to move the electricity is essential. 6
Before deregulation, the California IOUs were vertical monopolies
performing all the functions needed to generate, transmit, and distribute
electricity to their customers.37 As such, prior to the z96os the IOUs
operated as islands within California, each functioning independent of
the others, with just a few small transmission lines connecting them. 8
California's early transmission system was designed to meet the specific
needs of the ratepayers living on each "island," rather than the needs of
California as a whole.39
This began to change in the late i96os as the IOUs sought to gain
access to new power plants being built in neighboring states.40
Unprecedented amounts of generation were then being built in
Washington, Oregon, Canada's British Columbia, Nevada, Arizona, New
Mexico, Utah, and Mexico's Baja California.4 ' The IOUs connected with
these new power plants by building over I8,ooo miles of new
transmission lines across state and national borders.42
In addition to connecting with other states, the IOUs sought to
connect with the other in-state "islands." They did so by building major
north-south transmission lines within California, connecting San Diego,
Los Angeles, and San Francisco, linking the service areas of San Diego
Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison, and Pacific Gas and Electric
respectively.43 In-state projects continued throughout the 197OS and
i98os, resulting in California's current 31,721 mile-long transmission

INST., FEDERAL SITING AuTHORrry: KEY TO EXPANDING ELECrRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE (2oo2), availableat

http://www.eei.org/industry-issues/energy-infrastructureltransmission/federalsiting.pdf (stating that
"[e]lectric transmission grids serve as the backbone for developing power markets by providing the
means to move power from where it's generated to where it's needed." (emphasis added)).
36. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 97; see KERRY HATrEVIK, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE
CURRENT TRANSMISSION PLANNING PROCESS FOR INVESTOR OWNED UTILITIES 5, 8 (2003) (on file with
author). But see CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, STAFF REPORT: UPGRADING CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRIC
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ACrIONS 8 (2003) [hereinafter ISSUES AND AcrIONS] (stating that
thermal generating plants, such as those running on natural gas or nuclear energy, have been built
close to where their electricity is used, thereby requiring relatively short transmission lines).
37. See Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 98-99.
38. IsSUES AND ACnONS, supra note 36, at 8. One exception was the 1930s construction of a
transmission line from Southern California to Nevada to access hydroelectric power from the new
Hoover Dam. CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
39. IEPR, supra note 9, at 6.
40. CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at 3; IEPR, supra note 9, at 6.
41. CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at 3-8.

42. CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at 3-8; see also Joskow, supra note 5, at 366-67
(mentioning that during the i96os and i97os the IOUs built new transmission connections to the
Northwest and Southwest).
43. CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
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grid.'
Transmission expansion faltered in the 199os. From the i96os to the
i98os, transmission investments totaled $4.1 billion.45 Since then,
transmission capacity has remained unchanged, with small increases
made primarily by municipal utilities.46 In fact, the California IOUs have
not added any significant transmission capacity in twenty years."
Nevertheless, California is still able to import vast amounts of electricity
from neighboring states; currently, imported power serves 15% to 30%
of the state's total electricity demand 8
B.

SOCIETAL BENEFITS OF A ROBUST TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

The ability to move electricity creates stunning benefits for society.
A robust transmission system makes the electricity system more reliable,
helps protect the environment, and saves money by increasing the
efficiency of the whole system. Understanding these benefits is crucial to
appreciating the importance of transmission regulation in California.
I. Reliability
A reliable supply of electricity depends on a robust transmission
system.49 Every day in California, transmission regulators perform an
elaborate dance to ensure that Californians can light their homes, water
their crops, and manufacture their silicon chips. Because electricity is a
unique resource in that it cannot be stored, 0 the ISO must continuously
monitor electricity demand and purchase electricity to meet that demand
only hours before it is used.5 And because all the supply in the world
means nothing without the means of transporting it to the user, the ISO
also manages the transmission grid to ensure adequate capacity exists to
deliver power to the consumer. Keeping the lights on requires immediate
delivery of power over transmission lines.
In addition to its role in securing day-to-day system reliability, a
robust transmission system acts as insurance against catastrophic events.
When power plants break down, droughts limit hydroelectric supplies, or
44.
45.
46.
47.

ISSUES AND AcnONS, supra note 36, at 6.
See CONSULTANr REPORT, supra note 9, at I.

Id. at 4.
Id.; ISSUES AND ActioNs, supra note 36, at 8; see IEPR, supra note 9, at 7.

48. CONSUMER POWER & CONSERVATION FIN. AuTH., ENERGY RES. CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM'N,
& PUB. UTILS COMM'N, STATE OF CAL., ENERGY AcTION PLAN

4 (May 8, 2003) [hereinafter

ENERGY

ACTION PLAN]; Yuffee, supra note 12, at 67.
49. ENERGY ACTION PLAN, supra note 48, at 7; IEPR, supra note 9, at 6; see ISSUES AND ACTIONS,
supra note 36, at 6o-6i, 63.
50. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 98 (describing this fact as "the one basic and overwhelmingly
important physical fact about electricity that defines the structure of the electricity industry and
distinguishes it from most other sectors of the economy").
5i. See Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 98; ISSUES AND ACnONS, supra note 36, at 6o-6i (describing the
role of the ISO).

December 2004]

TRANSMISSION IN TRANSITION

heat waves increase demand for electricity to run air conditioners,
electricity regulators must get creative to find emergency sources of
power to prevent blackouts. Extensive transmission interconnections
allow this to happen, giving grid managers a tool to bring power in from
afar.
Numerous examples exist to illustrate the point. On March 8, 2004,
as temperatures in Southern California climbed to record highs and too
many people turned on the air conditioning, the state was forced to shut
off power to 70,000 customers for 21 minutes, marking California's first
rolling blackout since 20012 When demand rose faster than the ISO
could turn on new power plants, the state's inadequate transmission
system prevented it from moving readily available power from the north
to the south.53
When such emergencies arise, adequate transmission infrastructure
can turn a catastrophe into an opportunity. For example, when the
formation of OPEC and the 1973 Oil Embargo led to skyrocketing
electricity prices in the mid-1 9 70s,' California's transmission system
allowed it to gain access to non-oil electricity generation.5 In so doing,
the state not only averted devastating economic losses, but turned the
losses into savings of $ioo million every month of the crisis.6
While the Oil Embargo involved too little supply, similar
opportunities arise when too much supply exists. For example, in 1984 an
abnormally wet rainy season hit the Pacific Northwest, leading to
superior hydroelectric power production and reduced prices for
electricity. 7 Through its interconnections to the Pacific Northwest,
California was able to adapt on the fly by increasing imports of this
cheap power while reducing imports of more expensive power from
other places. This saved the state over $900 million in 1984 alone."'
Although these stories show the strategic benefits of a robust
transmission system when unforeseen events occur, unfortunately the
more common result of such events is serious system failure, as the
Northeast power outage of August 14, 2003 graphically illustrates. The
massive blackout in the Midwest, Northeast, and Canada was largely
caused by the failure of three transmission lines that shorted out after
52. Elizabeth Douglass, Unexpected Heat Wave Cited in Blackout, L.A. TIMES, Mar. to, 2004, at
CI.

53. Id. The San Diego wildfires of 2003 were a close call. Fires took out a major transmission line
from Arizona to San Diego, and narrowly missed another line. Thankfully the second line stayed
intact as failure would have meant blackouts in large portions of San Diego. Elizabeth Douglass,
Sempra Sees Need for Market Reform, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2004, at Ci.
54. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 99.
55. See CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at ii.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 12.
58. Id.
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contacting nearby trees. 9 The temporary U.S.-Canada Power System
Outage Task Force points to slow responses by transmission operators as
a factor that worsened the situation." While power plant outages and
significant human error played important roles in the crisis, the fact is
that all of this shows the critical importance of a robust transmission
system as the last line of defense against electrical catastrophe. When 50 2
million people lose power resulting in $6 to $8 billion in economic loSS,6
the meaning of "reliability" hits home.
2.
EnvironmentalProtection
In addition to ensuring system reliability, a healthy transmission
system helps preserve natural resources. First of all, transmission can
serve as a substitute for generation by getting more out of existing power
plants through the strategic transfer of electricity from areas of surplus to
areas of scarcity. Most of California's power plants are old and inefficient
fossil fuel combustion plants. 63 These plants heavily pollute the
environment by emitting nitrogen oxide, volatile organic compounds,
benzene, formaldehyde, and other chemicals into the air. Such
emissions pose serious threats to human health.6' Generation also
requires water for cooling, burdening one of California's most critical
resources and undermining an interest of "paramount importance to the
state." 66 By substituting transmission for generation, we ease these
environmental burdens.
Secondly, transmission is the key to unlocking California's
renewable energy potential.6 For example, inadequate transmission
linking California's wind farm in the Tehachapi Mountains to customers
in Southern California results in the voluntary removal of numerous
59.

U.S.-CAN.

POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, INTERIM REPORT: CAUSES OF THE AUGUST 14

33-43 (2003) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; Tom
Diemer, Answers sought at blackout forum; N.Y. officials show their anger at hearing, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Dec. 6, 2003, at Ci; Demetri Sevastopulo, U.S. hesitation makes power failures likely,
FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 30, 2003, at 8; Matthew L. Wald, What's Next; To Avert Blackouts,
a Sag-Free Cable, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at G8.
6o. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 59, at23.
6i. Id.at 2i.
62. Mark McGranaghan et al., Optimizing Power Quality and Reliability Initiatives, TRANSMISSION
& DISTRIBUTION WORLD, Feb. I, 20o4, at 2.
BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

63. Yuffee, supranote 12, at 67.

64. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Fighting Back Against a Power Plant: Some Lessons From the Legal
and Organizing Efforts of the Bayview-Hunters Point Community, 3 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVrL. L. &
POL'Y 407,410 (1996).
65. Id.
66. IEPR, supra note 9, at 40.
67. IEPR, supra note 9, at 16 ("[Tlhe extent to which the need for and location of new
transmission capacity is identified and ultimately permitted will determine whether the state will
continue to rely largely on conventional technology or broaden the mix of cleaner renewable
resources."); Jim Crogan, There's Cheap Energy Blowing in the Wind, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, atM3
(interviewing Randall Swisher).
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windmills from productive use.68 These idle windmills would have the
capacity to provide enough electricity every day to power about half a
million homes for a month.6" Transmission expansion would enable the
state to use this wasted renewable energy."
And finally, California and the Pacific Northwest states have shown
that transmission lines can protect endangered species through
"environmental energy exchanges."'" During the summer, Northwest
endangered salmon migrate to the sea along the Columbia and Snake
rivers.72 But during the 1990s their survival became jeopardized as large
numbers of salmon met a gruesome fate after swimming into
hydroelectric turbines.73 To protect the fish, the Northwest stopped the
plants at critical migratory periods, allowing the salmon to pass safely
downstream, and made up for the lost electricity by importing power
from California along the north-south transmission line.74 In exchange for
this service, California was able to cope with a demon of its own-air
pollution-by increasing hydroelectric imports during peak demand
periods.75 This allowed the state to shut off its most inefficient and
polluting class of power plants, known as "peaker" plants, which it would
otherwise call upon for the last bit of supply during the highest
consumption hours. 6 These environmental energy exchanges were made
possible by a robust transmission system.'
3. Improved Economic Performance
A vigorous transmission system not only helps ensure system
reliability and environmental protection, but saves money also.
California spends $82 million per day on electricity, or nearly $30 billion
68. Crogan, supra note 67, at M3; Mark Riley, Silence of the Fans In Insane Power Struggle,
Mar. 3, 200, at i9;Susan Sward, A Lost Opportunity That Worsened
Crisis; Utilities and FederalRegulators Shut the Dooron Renewable Power in California, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 12, 2OO, at AL.
69. Riley, supra note 68, at 19.
70. Southern California Edison has apparently realized this and is proposing to build a new 230
kV transmission line connecting Tehachapi with its customers. See CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9,
at 20. The line is to be completed by 2006. Id.
71. Id. at bo.
72. Blaine Hardin, Salmon's Return Spurs Debate on Spill at Dams; Need for Costly Measure
Questioned,WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2004, at A.o3.
73. Id.
74. CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at o.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Unfortunately, hard economic times in the Northwest have led to criticism of the salmon
protection measures. Hardin, supra note 72, at A.o3. Opponents of the program, including Bonneville
Power Authority (the utility stuck with the idle hydroelectric plants), claim it is costing residents
millions in increased electricity costs. Id. Proponents of the program, including scientists,
environmental groups and Native American tribes, insist that the program is needed to ensure the
viability of the species, and argue that the fish must still be protected because their temporary recovery
has resulted from recent favorable ocean conditions. Id.
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
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per year." For perspective, California's entire 2004-2005 budget
allotment for K-I2 education is just over $27 billion, $3 billion less than
its electricity spending.79 The state's $7.5 billion higher education budget
is about one fourth of its electricity costs."' These vast electricity
expenditures present significant cost-saving opportunities.
Such opportunities have been realized in the past. For example, the
transmission line expansions undertaken since the I96OS cost around $4.1
billion and increased import capacity to 18,170 MW. 8' Gaining the
equivalent amount of electricity by buildiing new "peaker" power plants
would have cost about $io billion. 8' Substituting transmission lines for
new power plants thus saved California massive sums.
Examining specific transmission projects vividly illustrates the
dazzling economic opportunities in transmission line expansion. Building
the transmission line to the Pacific Northwest in the I96os cost $1.6
billion."3 Over the 30-plus years of operation, the line has saved
Californians $7.2 billion." Similar savings have accrued from
transmission lines to the Southwest states of Nevada and Arizona.
Constructing the lines cost $1.3 billion, with overall savings of $5.7
billion8'
In addition to daily benefits, transmission lines can pay for
themselves when unforeseen events arise. For example, in the case of the
Pacific Northwest line discussed above, savings during an abnormally wet
1984 totaled $900 million, which was greater than the total investment in

78. IEPR, supra note 9, at v (stating that California spends $82 million per day on electricity. This
$82 million multiplied by 365 days per year equals $29,930,000,000, or about $30 billion).
79. See ELIZABETH G. HILL, CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, THE 2004-05 BUDGET:
PERSPECTIVES AND ISSUES, REPORT FROM THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE
BUDGET

COMMrTrEE, 68 fig.2 (2004),

available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2004/2004-pandi

/pandi o4.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
8o. See id. In reality, normally the state does not pay directly for electricity, but rather consumers
pay in their monthly utility bills. But a comparison with state spending on such programs as education
is sensible in light of the fact that electricity costs likely impact citizens' willingness to absorb greater
tax burdens, ultimately impacting state spending. So, while savings in electricity bills will not directly
impact state programs, in effect the two issues are related.
8I. CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at i.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 13.
84. Id. This figure represents the actual amount of electricity imported times the difference
between California's marginal cost of generation and that of the Pacific Northwest. Id.
85. Id. at 14. If these transmission savings seem incredible, consider the fact that California's
power plants burn the most environmentally benign, yet most expensive, fossil fuel: natural gas. Not
only is natural gas expensive, it exhibits significant price volatility. For example, in 2001 alone, natural
gas prices shot up and down, first up to around $6o/mmbtu, then down to $io/mmbtu, only to rise
again to about $36/mmbtu, and fall again all the way to $4/mmbtu by year's end. Joskow, supra note 5,
at 378 fig.2. Power plants in Arizona and Nevada burn primarily coal, a much cheaper (and more
polluting) fuel source. CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at 14 (describing how California's higher
cost natural gas generation was replaced by lower cost coal power from outside the state).
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the transmission line at the time.' Additionally, because transmission
allows a state to do more with less generation, transmission expansion
allows reserve margins to be lowered." For example, transmission
expansion has allowed California to reduce its reserve margin by
approximately 2,000 MW, representing savings of about $I billion.
While these savings are impressive, further savings can be had by
reducing California's pervasive transmission congestion."' Congestion
occurs when "local demand for energy approaches the limits of the
transmission system's ability to supply it."' In other words, congestion is
a bottleneck in the line, blocking power from flowing through. This
congestion means that vast amounts of low-cost generation are
unavailable under California's current transmission system.9 A recent
study by the Department of Energy concluded that nationwide,
bottlenecks cost consumers hundreds of millions of dollars annually.92 In
California, such congestion cost consumers just under $ioo million
during the summers of 200 and 2001 alone.93 Recent generation built
86. CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at 12.
87. A reserve margin is excess supply held on "reserve" just in case demand grows higher than
expected. Duane, supranote I,at 485 n.52.
88. See CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at I.
89. See IEPR, supra note 9, at 17 ("[T]he transmission system regularly experiences congestion
on major paths that prevents its optimal economic operation."); Alan Ramo, California's Energy
Crisis-the Perilsof Crisis Management and a Challenge to EnvironmentalJustice, 7 ALa. L. ENVTL.
OUTLOOK 1, 5 (2002) (stating that California's "congested transmission system" cannot "efficiently
deliver electricity from everywhere to everywhere in the state, let alone across the country"); Yuffee,
supra note 12, at 68 ("California's transmission system is severely constrained.").
o
9 .ENERGY DICrnONARY, at http://www.energyvortex.com/frameset.cfm?source=/energydictionary
/energyvortex.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2004) (defining "congestion"); see also U.S. FED. ENERGY
REGULATORY COMM'N, ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION CONSTRAINT STUDY 5 (200o) [hereinafter FERC Study]
(offering four reasons why transmission lines become congested: (I)insufficient transmission capacity
to meet demand in a particular area; (2)insufficient generation to meet demand within a constrained
area; (3)more generation selling into a system than transmission lines can handle; and (4)overall
system conditions), available at http://www.ferc.gov/cust-protect/moi/constraintstudy.pdf (last visited
Jan. 6, 2004). Professor Josko has stated:
Historically, congestion on California's transmission network tends to occur in the north to
south direction as a result of abundant suppliers of hydroelectric energy in the north-west
and northern California in the spring and early summer, when demand is relatively low.
Congestion tends to occur in the south to north direction in the autumn and winter at night
when cheap energy from the south-west is (effectively) being exported to the north-west
through California.
Joskow, supra note 5, at 373 n.27.
91. ISSUES AND ACTIONS, supra note 36, at 66 (offering $9oo million as the cost of such constrained
generation).
92. SPENCER ABRAHAM, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY, at xi (2002),
availableat http://tis.eh.doe.govlntgs/gridstudylmain-screen.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
93. FERC Study, supra note 90, at 9. Federal investigators have found evidence of intentional
congestion used to drive down supply during the electricity crisis. Jonathan Peterson, Glendale Settles
Suit Over Energy Trading; The City Agrees to Pay $25,000 But Admits No Wrongdoing During the
State's Energy Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at CI. The investigafion ended in a settlement of
$25,000 from Glendale. Id.
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across the U.S.-Mexican border without adequate transmission lines into
California has exacerbated the congestion problem in Southern
California.94
The significant benefits of transmission -including increased system
reliability, environmental protection, and enhanced economic
performance -show
the importance of examining the regulatory
environment governing this system.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
In contrast to these rather straightforward benefits, transmission
planning in California is maddeningly complex.95 It is governed by a
multitude of state laws6 giving oversight to three separate state agencies 97
whose plans are impacted by local, regional, and federal policies.9 This
section describes the roles played by the ISO, CPUC, CEC, and FERC.
A.

THE ROLE OF THE ISO

Before deregulation, each utility generated electricity and managed
its transmission lines to transport that energy to consumers. But
deregulation decentralized generation, which created a need for a central
body to match supply with demand and ensure adequate capacity to
transmit that supply along the grid. This is the role of the ISO.
The ISO is not a state agency, but rather a non-profit "public
benefit" corporation with a five-member Board of Governors appointed
by the governor.' The ISO's basic job description is to "ensure [the]
efficient use and reliable operation of the transmission grid."" ° After
deregulation, the ISO gained control of the IOUs' transmission lines,' I
which account for 8o% of California's transmission sector.'" The IOUs
retain ownership of the lines" 3 and they share the duty to ensure the grid
runs smoothly. 4

94. Craig D. Rose, Power Firms Gain from Grid Congestion; Deal with State Costs Consumers
Millions, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 15, 2004, at A-i.
95. Cf. Joskow, supra note 5 at 370 (describing California's post-deregulation market structure as
"the most complicated set of wholesale electricity market institutions ever created on earth").
96. These laws include: CAL. PUB. RES.CODE §§ 25300-25323 (West 2004) (CEC must promulgate
an Independent Energy Policy Report every two years); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 330-397 (West 2004)
(electricity deregulation); id. § oot (CPUC grants a CPCN for new transmission projects); id. § 399.15
'(extending CPUC responsibility for ensuring adequate transmission capacity).
97. HATrEVIK, supranote 36, at 3.

98. Id. at2.
99. Joskow, supra note 5, at 369,371.
CAL. PUB.UTIL. CODE § 345.

IOO.

sot. Joskow, supra note 5,at 370.
io2. Issues and Actions, supra note 36. at 61.
103. Joskow, supra note 5, at 371.
104. ISSUES AND AcrIONS, supra note 36, at 12, 61. Another 7,500 MW of generation is controlled

not by the ISO but rather by four other control entities: the Los Angeles Department of Water and
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Ensuring the reliability of the grid is a complex task requiring
continuous vigilance. The ISO conducts an annual control area study
looking at the utilities' future transmission needs and planning
accordingly."°5 Any especially large or complex transmission project
likely to significantly impact the system will get special attention,
including a detailed analysis of environmental impacts and potential
alternatives. 6 The ISO faces unique challenges with San Francisco and
San Diego due to their limited generation and vulnerability to outages."
To prevent shortages, the ISO determines "reliability must-run" power
plants-plants located on the constrained side of the transmission
bottleneck that "must run" to ensure that the area has power-then
enters year-long contracts to purchase power at a fixed rate instead of
relying on the spot market.' Finally, the ISO conducts interconnection
studies to ensure that any .new power coming into the system does not
max out the lines."° In short, the ISO plays a central role in ensuring the
reliability of the transmission grid.
The ISO conducts a needs assessment before any new transmission
lines can be built."' But despite significant study by the ISO, a new
transmission project is not ready for construction at this point because
the ISO does not have statutory authority to grant a permit. That is the
role of the CPUC.
B.

THE ROLE OF THE

CPUC

The CPUC is a state agency established
telephone, taxi cab, and other utilities."'
extensive role in dealing with California's
gatekeeper for new transmission projects.
issuing permits for new transmission lines;
electricity needs each year.
I.

in 1911 to regulate electric,
The Commission plays an
electric utilities and is the
Its two main jobs are: (i)
(2) planning for the IOUs'

PermittingProcess

Under California Public Utilities Code § iooi, the CPUC must issue
Power (LADWP, which controls the area around Los Angeles), the City of Pasadena, Sacramento
Municipal Utility District (SMUD, which controls an area around Sacramento), and the Imperial
Irrigation District (IID, which controls an area roughly east of San Diego county, south and east of the
borders with Mexico and Arizona). See id. at 12; Joskow, supra note 5, at 371 n.17. Each of these
entities had the choice of joining the ISO or retaining control of their lines, and each chose not to join.
See Joskow, supra note 5, at 375 n.I7. They are required to coordinate with the ISO and other western
control areas. ISSUES AND ACTIONS, supra note 36, at 12.
105. HATTEVIK, supra note 36, at 1O.
Io6. Id.
107. See IEPR at 7 (describing the CEC's concern about reliability in San Diego and San
Francisco).
108. Id.
109. Id. at II.
1 to. HATrEVK, supra note 36, at 6.
I I. See CAL. CONST. art. 12; CAL. PUB. UIL. CODE § 301 (West 2004).
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a certificate of "public convenience and necessity" (CPCN) before any
utility can construct new transmission lines of 200 kV or more."2 Given
their significant economic, social, and environmental impacts, new
transmission projects cannot be granted a CPCN without a finding that
they are really necessary."3 This process is time-consuming because the
CPUC essentially duplicates the work already done at the ISO in
determining the need for a new line." 4 It conducts its own needs
assessment focusing on whether the project will lower electricity rates
(economic criteria) or whether the project will not impact rates, but is
needed to ensure the overall reliability of the system (reliability
criteria)." 5 While the deregulation law created the ISO and gave it
responsibility to ensure system reliability and to identify and procure
needed facilities to ensure reliability, it did not divest the CPUC of
authority to grant a CPCN." 6 So, deregulation introduced a significant
regulatory inefficiency which blocks development of the state's
transmission infrastructure.
An important step here is an analysis of potential environmental
impacts under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)."7' The
Commission conducts environmental studies similar to those required
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)" s Where a
transmission project will have a "significant effect on the
environment,""..9 the CPUC must create an environmental impact report
setting forth in detail the potential environmental impacts of the project,
measures to reduce these impacts, and alternatives to the project. 2 If a
transmission project passes the CPUC's needs assessment and
environmental review, the Commission grants a CPCN and the project is
ready for construction.
2.
ProcurementProcess
The "procurement process" is a planning process where the IOUs
meet with the CPUC every year to determine what combination of
generation, transmission, and demand-side options will best serve
consumers.'' This planning phase is considered an ideal forum for long
term planning by bringing together decision-makers to discuss the best
112. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § IOOI; HATTEVIK, supra note 36, at 6; ISSUES AND ACTIONS, supra note
36, at 60.
113. Cf HATTEVIK, supra note 36, at 6.
114. HATrEVIK, supra note 36, at 14.
115. Id.
II6. ISSUES AND ACTIONS, supranote 36, at 60.
117. See California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21IOO (West 2004).
118. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (2004); Ramo,

supra note 89, at 15.
119. CAL. PUB.RES. CODE § 21068.
120. See id. at § 2iioo(a)-(b) (West 2004).
121.

See HATrEVIK, supra note 36, at 15.
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way to allocate resources to meet system needs.'22 Once the IOUs and
CPUC have agreed upon the optimal combination of generation,
transmission, and energy conservation, the CPUC approves the plan.' 3
To summarize, before deregulation the CPUC studied the need for
new transmission projects. 2 4 Deregulation confused the process by giving
to the ISO the job of planning for transmission grid reliability while
retaining in the CPUC the power to grant a CPCN.'25 As a result, both
the CPUC and the ISO conduct parallel needs assessments before a
transmission project is approved.
C.

CEC
The CEC is California's "primary energy policy and planning
agency...... As such, it has two important functions in electricity planning.
First, it licenses new thermal power plants of 50 megawatts (MW) or
more.'2 7 A megawatt is enough power to light roughly 750 homes; a
megawatt-hour lights those same homes for an hour. ,8 Local
governments are responsible for licensing smaller plants and those which
are non-thermal (i.e. they run on renewable energy).'29 Second, the CEC
has an important policy-making role. 3 In 2002, the California
Legislature passed SB 1389, requiring the CEC to create an Integrated
Energy Policy Report (IEPR) every two years.' 1 In this process, the
CEC is required to "conduct assessments and forecasts of all aspects of
energy industry supply, production, transportation, delivery and
distribution, demand, and prices" and then use these assessments to
"develop energy policies that conserve resources, protect the
environment, ensure energy reliability, enhance the state's economy, and
protect public health and safety.' ' 32 Because the IEPR is supposed to
assess "all aspects"'33 of the energy industry, the CEC now has a statutory
ROLE OF THE

Id. at 16.
123. See id.
at 15.
124. Supra Part II.B.i.
125. HATrEVIK, supranote 36, at 6.
122.

126. ISSUES AND ACTIONS, supra note 36, at 60.
127. HATTEVIK, supra note 36, at 5.A thermal power plant is the typical power plant. It uses
combustion of a fossil fuel (usually coal, oil, or in California, natural gas) to generate heat which turns
a turbine in order to create a spark which is captured and used as electricity. See Bhagwat, supra note
5,at 97. Nuclear plants are not considered thermal plants. See id. The CEC is also responsible for
licensing nuclear plants. HATrEVIK, supra note 36, at 5128. Robert B. Martin, III, Note, Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust Enforcement in
the CaliforniaElectricity Crisis, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 272 n.6 (2o03) (citing Jaskow, supra note 5,at
375).
529. HATrEVIK, supra note 36, at 5-6.
130. See IssuEs AND ACTIONS, supra note 36, at 6o.

131. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 25302(a) (West 2004).
132. Id. § 2530i(a).

133. Id.
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role in transmission planning.'34 The first IEPR came out in December
2003. 1'

FERC
Power Act of 1935, FERC has jurisdiction over
Federal
the
Under
"the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce.' ',, 6 This
means that FERC oversees transmission projects between states, such as
lines between California and the Southwest, Utah, and the Pacific
Northwest.'37 Given the significant amount of electricity currently flowing
from outside the state,'"" FERC policies significantly impact California's
transmission system.
FERC policy is especially important when California wants to
connect with a new power plant. One might assume that power plants are
built close to transmission lines so they will be easily connectible and
ready to serve consumers. But this is not the case. Because power plants
are expensive machines which heavily burden the environment,'39
deciding where to build one depends on many factors, such as access to
fuel for combustion and water for cooling. 4 Thus, "[m]ost generation
plants ... tend to be located in rural areas some distance from centers of
consumption for some combination of economic, environmental, safety,
and (in the case of hydroelectric power) geographic reasons..'' 14.
Transmission lines must be built to reach these distant plants.
FERC has power to change this but has decided not to do so. FERC
requires power plant builders to pay the costs of new transmission lines
up front, but allows them to be repaid with interest within five years."
Because the costs of new lines will be recovered so quickly, generators
have virtually no incentive to build power plants close to existing
transmission lines. 43 Through such pricing policies, FERC significantly
impacts transmission planning in California.
D.

THE ROLE OF

134. Id. § 25303(a)(3) ("The [CEC] shall conduct electricity and natural gas forecasting and
assessment activities... including... [a]ssessment of the availability, reliability, and efficiency of
the ... California electricity and transmission system capacity and use."); HATEVIK, supra note 36,
at 8.
135. IEPR, supra note 9.
136. 6 U.S.C. § 824(b).(2004); N.Y. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 535 U.S. i, 1 (2oo2).
137. See ISSUES ANi ACTIONS, supranote 36, at 6x.
138. ENERGY ACTION PLAN, supra note 48, at 4 ("Fifteen to thirty percent of statewide electricity
demand is served from sources outside state borders."); see also HATTEVIK, supra note 36, at 4
(mentioning that California is "import dependent"); Yuffee, supra note 12, at 67 (stating that
California relies heavily on imported power during periods of peak demand).
139. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 97.
140. HATTEVIK, supra note 36, at 8; Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 97.
141. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 97
142. HATTEVIK, supra note 36, at i8-I9.
143. See id. at 20.
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PROPOSALS TO CHANGE CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION
REGULATORY SYSTEM

The old adage "too many cooks spoil the soup" resonates when
discussing California transmission regulation.'" Overlapping jurisdictions
and redundancy in reviewing new projects have led to delays in planning
and permitting transmission lines.' 5 This Part first provides an overview
of the main criticisms leveled at California's transmission regulatory
system, and then lays out two specific proposals to change the system.
The next Part provides some analytic tools to help the reader chart for
him or herself the best course for California's future electricity
transmission system.
A.

CRITICISMS OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY SYSTEM

The transmission licensing process has been roundly criticized by
state and federal governmental officials, academics, and private industry
actors. State officials closest to the process have sometimes been its
harshest critics, describing the process as "extremely complicated,
balkanized, and redundant."'' 46 Other officials have said that the
"overlapping and conflicting processes associated with project planning,
assessment, licensing and approval" are among the "biggest impediments
to the development of new transmission projects in California.""
Summing up the criticisms, the CEC states that
[t]he permitting of transmission lines in California currently suffers
from jurisdictional responsibilities that are fragmented and
overlapping, environmental analyses that are inconsistent, and
inadequate consideration of regional and statewide benefits. As a
result, existing permitting processes create duplication between local,
state, and federal agencies, delay in approvals, and denial of needed
projects.''

These criticisms warrant more elaborate consideration given the
important role transmission plays in securing reliable, efficient,
environmentally

benign energy.'49 Three criticisms are particularly

relevant: (i) duplicative needs assessment; (2) absence of a model to
predict future transmission needs in a competitive market; and (3) lack of
coordinated planning between the CEC, ISO, CPUC, and IOUs.
I. DuplicativeNeeds Assessment
One common criticism relates to the way new transmission projects
144. See HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE, LAW MISCELLANIES, reprinted in AMERICAN LAW: THE

FORMATIVE YEARS 157 (Morton J. Horwitz & Stanley J. Katz eds., N.Y., Arno Press 1972).
145. See supra Part II.
146. HATrEVIK, supra note 36, at 2.
147. CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at 18 ("Changes to the current process are sorely
needed.").
148. IEPR, supra note 9, at 19.
149. See supra Part I.B (discussing various benefits of an adequate transmission infrastructure).
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are evaluated. As discussed above, before building a new transmission
project a utility must pass both the ISO and the CPUC, 5 ° and at both
steps the project is assessed for its need.15' This means that after a lengthy
process of providing transmission assessments, choosing a project from a
range of alternatives, and convincing the ISO it is needed, a project
proponent must again establish need before the CPUC. In practice,
however, the second needs assessment may be less duplicative than it
appears because CPUC does participate informally in the ISO process. 5
Nevertheless, duplication of effort wastes resources by leading to
unnecessary delays in project approval, costing the state billions in lost
opportunities.'53 This process sometimes kills important projects,
increasing the kind of regulatory uncertainty which is often blamed for
discouraging investment in new electricity infrastructure. '
2.
Inadequate Model for Assessing "Need"
Since two separate agencies determine need, it is perhaps not
surprising that they each have their own criteria for doing so, and that
these criteria are sometimes inconsistent. This is due to the fact that state
regulators have not yet agreed upon a universal methodology for
determining need. "' One approach is to determine whether the benefits
of a new project outweigh the costs. I56 Such forecasting is crucial before
regulators can approve expensive transmission projects which are
ultimately funded by ratepayers.'57 Under the vertically integrated
electricity system, this cost-benefit approach was workable because it was
relatively simple to determine how a new transmission project would
impact ratepayers of a particular IOU. Since a single utility owned all the
components needed to generate, transport, and deliver electricity to its
See supra Part IIA-B.
HATTEVIK, supra note 36, at 6.
152. See id. at it.
153. See supra Part I.B.3 (citing billions of dollars in savings through transmission system
expansion).
154. See, e.g., IEPR, supra note 9, at 6; Yuffee, supra note 12, at 68.
155. HATrEVIK, supra note 36, at 14.
156. Id. A cost-benefit analysis is not the only way to determine "need," but it is the test used in
California for so-called "economic" projects. These projects are justified on economic grounds, i.e.,
they will serve to reduce costs to consumers. Id. at 9. Since these projects exist to save money, a costbenefit analysis seems appropriate. In contrast, if a project exists not to reduce costs but rather to
ensure overall system reliability, it is defined as a "reliability" project. Id. A cost-benefit analysis also
seems appropriate for these projects since reliability saves money. However, it would seem inadequate
because overall system reliability concerns more than money: it ensures people can go about their
daily lives undisturbed by electricity shortages. Perhaps such factors are not incorporated into
determining "need" because it is easier to quantify economic criteria (i.e., reductions in utility bills)
than the reliability criteria (i.e., social happiness borne of a stable electrical supply).
157. For example, the cost of building a new 5o kV line 240 miles from San Diego to the
Southwest is estimated at $500 million to $2 billion. Interim Opinion on Transmission Constraints:
Southern California Link to the Southwest, Decision oi-io-o7o at 14 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n Oct. 25,
2001) [hereinafter CPUC Decision 01-10-070].
150.

151.
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customers, the IOU had the information needed to decide whether the
costs of the new project were outweighed by the benefit of connecting to
a new power plant. 5
Deregulation changed all that, and the cost-benefit analysis has
proven unworkable. For example, some industry watchdogs allege that
generators strategically bid electricity into regions of California with
congested power lines to benefit from market rules allowing them to be
paid to stop sending this power.'59 Building new transmission capacity
would make these payments unnecessary, thus saving the state money,
but the ISO has no way to count these savings in its decision process.
Without an agreed-upon way to decide when a project is needed, the
CPUC cannot legally delepiate its statutory responsibility for certifying
new transmission projects.
While deregulation exposed these shortfalls, uneasiness with models
to determine need predates deregulation. The methodologies have been
criticized for failing to take into account the long-term benefits of
transmission improvements, such as increased system reliability and
expanded access to regional power supplies. 6 ' Likewise, some of the
main benefits of transmission occur when unexpected events befall the
state,' 63 but current models do not consider such events in determining
need.' 64 Finally, current models fail to consider alternatives to new
transmission lines, such as new generation and energy conservation."
This is a fundamental point: transmission, generation, and conservation
are closely related because they are all means of achieving the same end,
namely, the provision of electricity service. To that end, each must be
considered alongside the others to decide the best way to serve
consumers. Keeping the big picture in mind, the end goal is to ensure an
electric industry which serves the best interests of Californians.
Assessments and models to determine need are where the rubber hits the
road in serving those interests.
3. Lack of CoordinatedPlanningBetween CEC, ISO, CPUC, and
IOUs
Despite the serious implications of an inadequate and duplicative
needs assessment model, critics have pointed to an even more

158. CPUC Decision oi-Io-o7o, supra note 157, at i5; Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 98-99; HATrEVIK,
supranote 36, at 14.
i59. Rose, supra note 94, at A-I.
i6o. CPUC Decision oi-Io-o7o, supra note 157, at 15; HATravIK, supra note 36, at 14.
161. See CAL. PUB. UnL. CODE § tooI (West 2004); HATraviK, supra note 36, at 15.
162. IEPR, supra note 9, at 18.
163. See supra Part I.B.i (discussing how transmission lines help ensure system reliability against
unforeseen events such as plant outages, droughts, and heat storms).
164. IEPR, supra note 9, at 18; CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at 17.
165. IEPR, supra note 9, at 18; CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at I7.
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fundamental and structural problem with the transmission licensing
process:
[mlany states have either generation and transmission siting under the
purview of one state agency (e.g. Arizona, Nevada) or do not have any
state generation siting at all (e.g. Idaho, Pennsylvania, Alaska). In
contrast, California has split generation and transmission siting
authority between two state entities and among local governments."
The problem with "split generation and transmission siting
authority" is that it hinders necessary coordination. Why is coordination
important? Meeting new electricity demand is possible through a range
of alternatives, such as building a new power plant, expanding
transmission connections, encouraging conservation, or a combination
thereof.6 Ideally a regulator should be able to consider all these factors
in planning how to meet projected demand.' 68 The separation of
transmission and generation planning has created a "fragmented and
uncoordinated planning process," leaving regulators on
69 both sides with
an incomplete picture of the state's electricity options.'
Because regulators cannot see the whole picture, sometimes
statewide interests are sacrificed for those of individual project
proponents. While serving the needs of the utilities and the ISO, the
current fragmented planning process may be overlooking statewide
interests like development of future renewable energy, overall system
efficiency and reliability, and the environmental performance of the
system.'70
This lack of coordination is supposed to be made up for in the
procurement process where the IOUs meet with regulators at the CPUC
every year to determine what combination of generation, transmission,
and demand-side options will best meet consumer demand. 7 ' However,
in reality the procurement process does little to coordinate planning for
three main reasons.
First, the process fails to consider the impact of any new power
plants on the already congested transmission system. 7 ' The process is too
limited in scope and doesn't consider whether a proposed power plant
will actually be able to deliver its electricity."' This has led to some
serious anomalies, such as the construction of new power plants across

i66. HATrEVIK, supra note 36, at 5.
167. See IEPR, supra note 9, at 8; HATrEVIK, supra note 36, at 15.
168. See IEPR, supra note 9, at 8; HAT'EVIK, supra note 36, at 15.
t69. HATTEVIK, supra note 36, at 3.
170. IEPR, supra note 9, at i8 (citing ISSUES AND ACTIONS, supra note 36, at 61-62).
171. See HATrEVIK, supra note 36, at I5.
172. CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 9, at I6.
173. Id.
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the U.S.-Mexican border despite inadequate transmission.'74
Second, the procurement process can be an ideal forum to find new
ways to meet demand in constrained areas like San Francisco and San
Diego, but it fails to do so. These areas are particularly susceptible to
electricity outages because of their lack of electricity generation or
transmission infrastructure, so the state contracts for "reliability mustrun" generation to ensure local reliability.'75 By failing to consider such
contracts in its long-term planning with the IOUs, the CPUC misses an
opportunity to fix the electricity problems facing San Diego and San
Francisco. "
Finally, these problems with coordinated agency planning have been
exacerbated by deregulation and laissez-faire federal policies. In 1996,
FERC Order 888 required utilities to open their transmission lines so77
that other companies could use them to sell electricity into the system.'
Determining need for new lines involves predicting potential future
power plants that may or may not ever be built. But deregulation
regulators are left hopelessly in the dark because they have no role in
shaping plant location decisions. Predicting the future usefulness of a
given transmission project depends on choices made by unregulated
companies that do not participate in the procurement process.
B.

PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE REGULATORY SYSTEM

Such widespread criticism has not been lost on California
policymakers. Two proposals have emerged to address them. The first,
would counter the redundancy in determining need, and give the ISO the
job of determining need by applying an agreed-upon methodology
capable of accurately modeling market factors, and the CPUC would
then issue a CPCN. The other proposal responds to the lack of
coordinated planning by centralizing transmission licensing under the
CEC, the agency which already licenses power plants. Some historical
context is needed to understand these proposals.
i. HistoricalContext
Each proposal can be seen as occupying a middle ground between
two historical modes of thinking about the role of regulation. Those two
schools of thought are the "integrated resource planning" model which
during the 1970s and I98os, and the market liberalism of the
dominated
17s
I99OS.

174. See supra Part I.B.3.
175. See supra Part II.A.
176. HATrEVIK, supra note 36, at 11-13.

177. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at ioo; see Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n 1996).
178. For a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of regulation as we now know it, see Duane,
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The model of "integrated resource planning" first developed in
California in the 197OS as the CEC set the existing regulation paradigm
on its head.' 7 Instead of the traditional approach to electricity regulation
which sought to increase supply in order to meet new demand, the CEC
flipped the equation by embracing conservation as a way to reduce
demand, thereby eliminating the need for new supply.' 8° This "demandside management" had revolutionary implications because it enabled
California to cut its annual rate of demand growth by 75% to 8o%
through the 197os and I98OS and to avoid building hundreds of new
power plants.' This approach was part of a national trend that
recognized the importance of thinking not only of increasing supply, but
also on decreasing demand through conservation."'
"Integrated resource planning" was subsequently challenged in the
early 199os by a new paradigm promoting deregulation of wholesale
electricity markets and reduced industry oversight by public utilities
commissions.' Deregulation was consistent with the social and political
climate of the day, as this was "the age of market triumphalism" when
"markets were the answer, government was the problem, and anybody
who thought otherwise was either Rip Van Winkle or a card-carrying
liberal clinging to the past."'
Deregulation of the airline,
telecommunications, natural gas, and trucking industries served as a
supra note I, at 476-94.
179. See id. at 482-87. The existing regulation model was known as the "utility consensus." Id. at
476. This model drew force from the larger political progressivism of the time, which sought to curtail
the opportunistic business practices of the early 2oth century. See GEORGE MOWRY, THE CALIFORNIA
PROGRESSIVES 11-12 (1951). It drew on the economic theory of "natural monopolies," which posits

that
the competitive running of wires and pipes above or below ground in duplicate, triplicate, or
more would be so obviously inefficient and a costly use of resources that we 'naturally'
permit monopolistic supply of such goods with decreasing average costs. However, price
gouging of the consumer will not be prevented by the classic workings of the competitive
elements, and too little electricity will be produced and consumed, so regulation substitutes
for the missing competition.
MICHAEL D. REAGAN, REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF POLICY 36-37 (1987), cited in Duane, supra
note I, at 476. Natural monopoly theory justified governmental regulation of the electricity industry
and formed the basis for policies which "granted individual companies exclusive franchises to provide
power within a specific geographic area as long as their rates were regulated by state regulatory
commissions based on the cost of providing service, including a reasonable return on investment."
Duane, supra note 1,at 476-77. Recognizing that the inherent nature of electricity (i.e., that it cannot
be stored and so must be bought at almost the same time it is consumed) further complicated things,
the "utility consensus" stands for the proposition that sometimes regulation is necessary to secure the
greatest benefits for all. See id. at 477-78.
18o. Id. at 483-84.
181. Id. at 484-85.
182. Id. at 487-88.
183. See id. at 496.
184. Id. at 491 (citing Michael Watts, Liberation Ecology: Development Sustainability, and
Environment in an Age of Market Triumphalism, in LIBERATION ECOLOGIES:
DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Richard Peet & Michael Watts eds., 1996)).
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model for deregulation of the electricity industry. 58 Deregulation
proponents challenged the "natural monopoly" theory, instead putting
faith in markets to secure incremental efficiency improvements.'6 By the
mid-I99OS deregulation had replaced "integrated resource planning" and
California became the poster child of the new order.
What these two approaches have in common is that they are both
points on the arc of a pendulum which has swung back and forth
throughout American history as people continually change regulatory
approaches to meet the needs of society. The following proposals to
change the electricity transmission regulatory system represent a
compromise between these two competing ideologies.
2.
CurrentProposalsto Change the System
The following are two competing proposals to change the
transmission licensing process in California'. Both proposals lay out
different visions for the future of transmission planning and licensing.
Decision-makers will eventually be forced to choose between these
alternative approaches, or come up with something better.
a. Create a Universal Methodology for Determining "Need"
and Require the CPUCto Defer to the ISO's Judgment
In response to the widespread criticism of the state's electricity
transmission licensing process, in 2003 the state's principal energy
agencies adopted a joint Energy Action Plan laying out broad goals for
California's energy industry as well as six specific actions to achieve
those goals.' One of those actions calls for an expansion of the state's
electricity transmission system, and calls on the CPUC to propose
changes to its CPCN process to achieve this objective.'9
In response to the Energy Action Plan, the CPUC issued an Order
proposing changes to its transmission assessment process.'N This Order
185. Id. at 489-9o.
186. Hoffman, supra note i; id. at 490.
187. ENERGY ACTION PLAN, supra note 48, at 2.
18& Id. at 7. The exact wording is important:
The Public Utilities Commission will issue an Order Instituting Rulemaking to propose
changes to its Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity [CPCN] process, required
under Public Utilities Code § iooi et seq., in recognition of industry, marketplace, and
legislative changes, like the creation of the CAISO and the directives of SB 1389. The
Rulemaking will, among other things, propose to use the results of the Energy
Commission's collaborative transmission assessment process to guide and fund IOUsponsored transmission expansion or upgrade projects without having the PUC revisit
questions of need for individual projects in certifying transmission improvements.
Id. (emphasis added). By calling for changes to the CPCN process in light of the creation of the ISO
and the directives of SB 1389, the energy agencies are likely referring to the duplicative needs
assessment process which was left after deregulation. This interpretation is bolstered by the final
clause, indicating the agencies' dissatisfaction with the CPUC revisiting questions of need for new
transmission projects.
189. See Order Instituting Rulemaking on Policies and Practices for the Commission's
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proposes two related changes: (I)to adopt a universal methodology for
determining the need for a new project; and (2) to allow the ISO to apply
this standard during its needs assessment process without the CPUC
revisiting the question of need except to make sure the methodology was
correctly applied.'" The CPUC requested that the ISO develop the new
methodology and submit it for CPUC approval.
The ISO worked with outside consultants for a year to develop this
new methodology, which it released on February 28, 2003. ' The
methodology strives to fill the void left by deregulation by including four
new factors in a transmission needs assessment: (I) the availability of
imports and exports of electricity; (2) the availability and dispatch of
hydroelectric and thermal generation; (3) future power plant additions;
and (4) market power.'92 By addressing each of these factors in one
comprehensive model, the ISO believes its methodology "far exceeds
anything that has been done to date in the area of transmission planning
studies."'93
After adoption of the methodology, the CPUC will defer to the
ISO's needs assessment." When a project emerges from the ISO
planning process, instead of conducting its own needs assessment, the
CPUC will merely check to see that the methodology was correctly
applied in the ISO process.' This will largely eliminate the inefficiency
of conducting duplicative needs assessments at both the ISO and the
CPUC." Through adopting the methodology and double-checking to
ensure its correct application, the CPUC believes it will adequately
comply with its statutory duties for determining need" while resolving
the regulatory redundancy that has been blamed for killing needed
transmission projects.
b. Centralize Transmission PlanningUnder the CEC
The second proposal seeks to centralize transmission planning by
adding transmission permitting to the CEC's existing duty over power
plant licensing. The CEC currently licenses thermal power plants of 50
MW or more and plays an indirect role in transmission planning through
publishing its Integrated Energy Policy Reports."' In response to calls for
Transmission Assessment Process, R.o4.o.026 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n Jan. 22, 2004).
190. Id. at 5.
191. CAL. ISO & LONDON ECON. INT'L, A PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING THE
ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TRANSMISSION EXPANSION IN A RESTRUCTURED WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY
MARKET (2003).
192. Id. at 4.
193. Id. at i.
194. Id. at 1-2.
195. Id. at 5.

196. Id. at i.
197. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § ioI (West 2004).
198. See supra Part II.C.
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greater integration between transmission and generation planning, the
CEC proposes to centralize power around itself by calling on the
Governor to give it power to license new transmission lines.'" The CEC
would model its transmission permitting process after the one it currently
uses to license power plants."° If adopted, this plan would work a major
reorganization of the administration of electricity planning. The goal is to
more fully integrate the transmission and generation planning processes
to ensure that California's electricity system serves the needs of
California as a whole, not just individual utilities or the ISO. 0 '
These two proposals to change the system seek to address the
widespread perception that California's transmission planning process is
"broken." It is thought that by eliminating the duplicative needs
assessment through the application of an agreed-upon methodology for
determining need, the state will realize the numerous benefits of a robust
transmission system. And by integrating transmission and generation
planning under the CEC, policymakers hope to further statewide
interests in fostering renewable energy, a reliable and efficient electricity
system, and environmental protection.
IV.
A.

ANALYTICAL MODEL TO ASSESS PROPOSALS

JUSTIFICATION

We now know that California's electricity transmission system has
been roundly criticized, and that regulators and legislators have proposed
specific changes to patch the holes left by deregulation. But the existence
of a plan does not prove its wisdom, and change for its own sake is
probably not a path California should tread. So, how do we determine
the best approach to changing California's electricity transmission
system?
Unfortunately, the current answer involves judging a proposal
against ideological assumptions about the proper role of government in
the marketplace, rather than bringing experience and nuanced technical
understanding to the decision."' This is perhaps understandable given the
i99. IEPR, supra note 9, at 20.
Id.
20L See id. at 8.
202. Bhagwat, supra note 5,at 121 (noting that "the designers of the California system appear to
have shared a deep, ideological commitment to 'market forces,' a commitment which sometimes
operated at the expense of careful consideration of how actual markets perform"); Duane, supra note
i, at 497 (mentioning that "[bly trying to offer something for everybody, [California's deregulation
law] was really a political compromise rather than an analytically-driven piece of legislation that
reflected the technical complexities of the industry and the industry's regulatory history"); Joskow,
supra note 5,at 370 (Stating that, in California's deregulation debates, "[i]deological rhetoric played a
bigger role than serious analysis or practical experience drawn from other countries.... Getting it
done fast and in a way that pandered to the many interests involved became more important than
getting it right."); cf. Duane, supra note i,at 539-40 ("[T]he relevant question is how to improve
200.
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complexity of the system."3 But while understandable, this is no way to
govern. Policymakers have a responsibility to rationally consider
competing policy choices without prejudging or merely seeking to justify
preexisting opinions. But without coherent factors to weigh,
policymakers are left unguided in this process.
This Part provides some guidance by proposing four factors to
consider in deciding between competing proposals to change California's
electricity transmission regulatory system: reliability, rate stability,
efficiency, and fairness. The first three factors were offered by Professor
Timothy P. Duane as "three of the policy goals of the regulatory regime"
for electricity.' The last factor, fairness, is a central principle of the
Environmental Justice movement and ensures that social justice is
considered.
B.

How THE MODEL WORKS
At the outset, something must be said to clarify how this model
works. The factors are intended to be in tension-increasing some will
necessarily diminish others. In other words, no proposal will further
reliability, rate stability, efficiency and fairness all at once. This ensures
that diverse values are weighed before making a decision. And because
each proposal will further some factors and not others, the weight given
to each factor will influence the outcome of the analysis. Weighing the
factors may depend on the specific context, and experience must inform
the process if it is to be useful in guiding regulatory policy choices. The
thought behind proposing a multifactor test is to counter the "onedimensional" character of the regulatory policy debate by providing a
vocabulary for discourse which illuminates the assumptions underlying
specific proposals.'
The four factors interrelate in meaningful ways. Some tend to be
complimentary, while. others are mutually exclusive. For example,
ensuring reliability usually comes at the expense of efficiency. It costs
money to purchase reserve capacity, dedicate resources for planning, and
invest in new infrastructure like transmission lines-costs which will be
passed on to consumers in higher electricity bills.2°6 Such risk-averse
measures-like paying for expensive reserve margins-will also harm
fairness interests because electricity bills are regressive and

efficiency without sacrificing system reliability of price stability. This is a different question from how
to deregulate another industry that seems stodgy and bureaucratic.").
203. See Duane, supra note i, at 535-36. For a useful discussion of the unique difficulty in
tinkering with regulation of the electricity industry, see generally id.
204. Id. at 538.

205. See Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 116 (noting "one-dimensional" character of debate).
206. However, California's transmission capacity investments over the years have saved billions of
dollars-hardly an inefficient policy. See supra Part I.B.

December

2004]

TRANSMISSION IN TRANSITION

disproportionately burden the most vulnerable.
Efficiency usually decreases reliability and rate stability, as
California's deregulation experience shows.2" Reliability increases
efficiency over the long-term by ensuring the system lives to see another
day. °8 Reliability also buttresses fairness because procedural fairness is
the first casualty when overall system reliability is threatened. For
example, California provided fast-track licensing processes for new
power plants during the energy crisis." 9 The CEC began licensing new
"peaker" power plants after only three weeks of review, a process which
was "truly devoid of any pretense of meaningful participation ..... This
example shows how fairness can give way to expediency when reliability
is threatened.
Interestingly, efficiency and fairness are not mutually exclusive."' By
replacing top-down regulation with streamlined processes, markets can ,
deliver rate savings that greatly benefit those who have the least to pay.
Rate stability also tends to further fairness interests as preventing price
fluctuations will tend to benefit the people whose budgets are tightest
and who can least absorb unexpectedly high rates.
While efficiency can be fair, fairness is often inefficient because
public participation takes time and consumes scarce resources. To the
extent that fairness tends to benefit discrete groups, such interests would
appear to accrue to the few while burdening the many with costly delays.
In practice, however, such burdens tend to be minimal, and in cases
where public participation really threatens the security of the majority,
the democratic process tends to intervene to remove such delays. 3
In short, this multifactor model helps bring rational order and a
methodology to regulatory restructuring decisions. The next Part shows
207. Duane, supra note I, at 538. Professor Duane states that reliability, rate stability, and
efficiency,
cannot all be maximized simultaneously: If we want to maximize efficiency, sacrifices must
be made in system reliability and rate stability. The advocates of [the] electricity
deregulation project claim that there are no tradeoffs: If society would simply trust in the
power of the market, it would be able to maximize all three of these policy goals. They are
wrong.
Id.
208. Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 118 (discussing how electricity markets create inefficiencies by
their inability to perform coordination and planning functions).
209. See Ramo, supra note 89, at 8.
2io. Id. at 15-17. "Peaker" power plants are small plants used for periods of maximum demand.
Id. at 15 n.6o. They are only used for limited times because they have little or no pollution control. Id.
at 20. Some still run on distillate oil, which is far more polluting than natural gas. Id.
21. See Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 116-17 (discussing the "one-dimensional" debate over the years
between proponents of efficiency and proponents of fairness).
212.

Id.

See generally Ramo, supra note 89 (discussing laws and regulations passed during the
California energy crisis which curtailed public participation in power plant siting in order to ensure
new generation supply).
213.
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one application of the factors to analyze the above-mentioned proposals
to change California's electricity transmission regulatory regime.
C. THE FOUR FACTORS
I. Reliability
According to the California Legislature, "[r]eliable electric service is
of utmost importance to the safety, health, and welfare of the state's
citizenry and economy. 2. 4 Keeping the lights on is the priority of a
reliability-based system, and this is accomplished by ensuring adequate
supply to meet demand. One way of ensuring adequate supply is by
requiring a "reserve margin," which is a certain amount of supply on
"reserve" in case it is needed." 5 Another way to ensure reliability is
through long-term planning."' Such planning was traditionally performed
by a regulated utility with the oversight of regulators." 7 This was the
hallmark of the "integrated resource planning" school, which ensured
reliability through long-term conservation efforts aimed at bringing
demand down to meet supply." ' Planners anticipate needed future
investments in electricity infrastructure, like new power plants and
transmission lines, as a way to foster reliability by creating supply and the
ability to deliver it on demand. Such reliability measures tend to create
an environment of regulatory certainty, often considered a prerequisite
for attracting new investment in a system. 19
2.
Rate Stability
Ensuring rate stability requires minimizing electricity price
fluctuations. Under the pre-deregulation cost-of-service industry, rate
stability was ensured by the CPUC which set prices for electricity based
on the cost of production plus a reasonable rate of return. " Price
stability became an important consideration after deregulation. The most
volatile price fluctuations tend to occur on so-called "spot markets,"
which are venues where sellers bid electricity which is bought by
purchasers to meet immediate demand' 2 California's over-reliance on
spot market purchases was one of the causes of the state's painful price

214. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(g) (West 1994).
215. See Bhagwat, supra note 5,at 118 (noting that reliability includes "assurances of adequate

reserve capacity").
216. Id. at 1i5 (arguing that the "root cause of California's crisis was clearly a failure of long term
planning, to ensure that supply kept up with demand").
217. Id.

218. See Duane, supra note i,at 487-88.
219. See, e.g., Yuffee, supra note 12, at 68 (stating that California's regulatory uncertainty of the
late 199os discouraged investment in electricity infrastructure); cf. Duane, supra note i,at 538.
220. Duane, supra note i, at 476-77.
221. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at I18 (describing a spot market as a "pure, contemporaneous
exchange").
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spikes during the energy crisis.222
But such price instability is not an inevitable result of a deregulated
market. California would have experienced less severe rate fluctuations
had it allowed utility companies to purchase some of their electricity
through long-term contracts with generators, instead of relying solely on
the spot market for purchases. 23 Such long-term contracts can serve
important rate stability interests.' 4 Also, much of the rate fluctuation was
caused by factors which may have increased costs even under a regulated
industry anyway, such as soaring fixed costs for natural gas to burn in the
power plants, and decreased hydropower coming from the Northwest
forcing California to rely on more expensive power plants." 5 Markets can
create rate stability if sufficient market participation, product diversity,
and ease of distribution exist,"' although this is a whole lot easier said
than done.
3. Efficiency
Transmission systems are considered "natural monopolies," meaning
that it makes more sense for all generators to share one set of lines than
for each generator to build its own duplicate lines. 2 7 Because of these
natural monopoly traits, "the transmission network and its operation will
be subject to continuing regulation.....s But given these natural monopoly

characteristics, what does the concept of efficiency add to the debate on
transmission regulation?2 9
The concept of efficiency can enlighten debate on transmission
regulation by highlighting areas where regulation is irrational, redundant,
and ineffective. Efficiency focuses attention on whether regulatory
systems impose undue delays, kill needed projects, and whether a given
regulatory body is institutionally competent to accomplish its function.
Considering efficiency in this sense adds value to transmission regulation
debates.

222. Yuffee, supra note 12, at 69-70. California's deregulation plan required utilities to rely solely
on the spot market for electricity purchases. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 115-16. In 2001, California
electricity costs spiraled upwards to $3,800 per MWh, roughly 1oo to 200 times the average cost a year
before. Duane, supra note i,at 517.
223. Yuffee, supra note 12, at 69-7o.
224. Long term contracts also help assure long-term planning consistent with enhancing overall
system reliability. See Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 119.
225. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at io8-iI (discussing California's bad luck in suffering through a
convergence of multiple damaging factors that would have caused serious problems no matter what
the structure of the electricity industry); see Duane, supra note i, at 5t t (noting California's 2o-fold
increase in natural gas prices during 2000-20oi, leading to dramatically increased electricity costs).
226. Ramo, supra note 89, at 5.
227. See Joskow, supra note 15, at 254.
228. Id. at 255.
229. Id. at 241, 247, 254.
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4. Fairness
Generally speaking, fairness refers to treating likes alike.2 3' Fairness
in electricity regulatory systems may require a number of actions to
ensure that all people have equal opportunity to influence policy. Such
actions often include providing notice of workshops to discuss proposed
projects, studying the potential for projects to disproportionately burden
poor or minority populations, 3 ' translating documents into non-English
languages, and providing access to the system for those without means
through the use of public liaisons like the CPUC's Public Advisor. 32
The Environmental Justice movement can provide guidance on the
meaning of fairness as it relates to transmission regulation. 33 Growing
out of the civil rights movement, Environmental Justice emerged as a
policy doctrine in 1994 when President Bill Clinton signed Executive
Order 12,898 directing each federal agency to "make achieving
environmental justice part of its mission." 234 The movement strongly
emphasizes participation by poor people and people of color in agency
decisions, including "the right to participate as equal partners at every
level of decision-making including needs assessment, planning,
implementation, enforcement and evaluation." 3 ' As applied in the
context of California's transmission regulatory process, this principle
means that fairness requires that all people have the right to participate
in the process from needs assessment to project evaluation.
V. APPLICATION OF THE FOUR FACTORS TO CURRENT PROPOSALS TO
REFORM CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION REGULATORY SYSTEM
Recall, the two proposals currently under consideration in California
are: (i) the idea that redundant needs assessments at the ISO and CPUC
justify giving the ISO sole responsibility for determining need through
the application of an agreed-upon methodology; and (2) the CEC's
proposal to reorganize the regulatory state by taking responsibility for
licensing new transmission projects, in much the same way it currently
licenses new power plants. These proposals are analyzed separately
below.

See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICrIONARY 509 (4th ed. 2002).
231. The CEC has conducted such studies. Ellen M. Peter, Implementing Environmental Justice:
The New Agenda for CaliforniaState Agencies, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 529, 570 (2ooi).
232. For
information on the CPUC Public Advisor's outreach programs, see
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static-aboutcpuc/divisionscsid/public+advisor/index.htm(last visited Jan. 6,
230.

2004).

233. See CAL. GovT. CODE § 65040, 12(e) (West 2004) (defining "environmental justice" as the "fair
treatment of people of all races, cultures, and incomes with respect to the development, adoption,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies").
234. Exec. Order No. 12,898,59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994); Ramo, supra note 89, at 12.
235. Ramo, supra note 89, at x3;see also Peter, supra note 231, at 538 (discussing the movement's
emphasis on public participation).
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GIVE THE

ISO

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETERMINING NEED

Giving the ISO responsibility for determining need will enhance
reliability. By lowering regulatory hurdles to the construction of new
transmission lines, this proposal would allow the benefits of a robust
transmission system to be realized. When transmission lines are licensed
in a timely manner, electricity can be moved from place to place in order
to reliably power homes and businesses. Redundant review of new
transmission projects adds one more step at which a potentially
important new project can be derailed. Reducing such regulatory
uncertainty will encourage investment in new projects and help current
projects move expeditiously forward.
By streamlining the process for new project approval, this proposal
will result in greater efficiency. And because new transmission projects
can result in billions of dollars in savings to consumers, constructing new
transmission lines can be efficient by allowing scarce resources (i.e.
consumer electricity payments) to be allocated to their most socially
valuable use (i.e. investments in transmission lines which will pay great
dividends to the state). Furthermore, because the ISO is relatively
insulated from politics, it may be better able to license needed
transmission lines over the outcry of local communities trying to protect
themselves.
While allowing for a more efficient allocation of resources also
furthers fairness interests, this proposal contains troubling implications
for public participation. The ISO is not a state agency per se, but rather a
corporation run for the "public benefit." The ISO has been criticized for
putting industry interests ahead of the public interest.236 Moreover,
FERC recently tried to change the ISO governance structure to insulate
it from public accountability. 237 Although the D.C. Circuit held that this
exceeded FERC's statutory authority, 238 the experience demonstrates
that fairness interests may be jeopardized by investing too much
authority in the ISO. In contrast, the CPUC is a constitutional agency in
no danger of having its governance structure altered by federal
regulators. 39 The CPUC also has extensive regulations governing its
practice and procedure. 4
Giving the ISO responsibility for determining need may indirectly
improve rate stability. Transmission system expansion can do much to
relieve the congestion on California's major transmission pathways. By
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streamlining regulatory approval for new projects, the state can prevent
electricity companies from intentionally bidding electricity into areas
with congested transmission lines in order to increase prices. Reducing
congestion would help ensure rate stability by reducing price fluctuations
caused by market manipulation.
On balance, three of the four factors are served by the proposal:
reliability, rate stability, and efficiency. Arguably, only fairness is
diminished. Therefore, unless fairness is weighted much heavier than the
others, it would seem that giving the ISO responsibility for determining
the need for new projects would further the goals of California's
electricity regulatory regime.
CEC
Integrating transmission licensing under the CEC will increase the
reliability of the whole electricity system. By conducting long-term
planning for both generation and transmission, the CEC will have
information vital to ensuring that new demands are met through a
mixture of supply and transmission additions. By centralizing planning,
this proposal would help ensure that power plants and transmission lines
are built and upgraded quickly and the overall system runs smoothly.
Integrated planning is generally considered a roadblock to
efficiency. In this case, the CEC would be responsible for determining
which new transmission lines are needed, which is the kind of function
which markets are considered more capable of accomplishing. This
proposal involves the kind of top-down regulation that led to marginal
price increases and perceived regulatory waste under the prederegulation "integrated resource planning" era. However, the proposal
has efficiency benefits. Allowing one agency to plan for generation and
transmission enables regulators to consider the most cost-effective
combination of power plant and transmission investments. This would
tend to decrease unnecessary investments and eliminate wasted costs,
thereby streamlining the regulatory system consistent with the dictates of
regulatory efficiency.
The CEC is a politically accountable executive branch agency
responsible for looking out for the people of California. It has adopted
internal regulations incorporating environmental justice considerations
into its decision-making process.24' As such, giving the CEC power to
license transmission lines may further fairness interests by protecting
underserved communities.
Centralizing transmission and generation planning will result in
greater rate stability. Centralized planning sends an unmistakable
message to industry about the state of the regulatory environment. Such
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signals are critical to ensure that companies are confident enough to
make new investments in infrastructure. And infrastructure expansion
will tend to reduce the market power of individual participants. Because
market power results in price volatility, centralized planning will increase
rate stability.
The CEC's proposal furthers interests in reliability, fairness, and rate
stability, with at most a marginal decrease in efficiency. The critical
factors needed to decide between the two proposals are therefore the
two factors sacrificed by either one: efficiency and fairness. The marginal
decrease in efficiency resulting from the CEC's proposal seems
outweighed by the potential for fairness to be sacrificed in a process led
by a politically insulated corporation. Giving the determination of need
to the least politically accountable agency may further efficiency but is
too problematic in terms of fairness. And bringing transmission licensing
together with generation planning under the CEC may actually increase
regulatory efficiency by fostering interagency coordination. Therefore,
giving the CEC power to license new transmission lines strikes the best
balance between ensuring efficient decisions without sacrificing public
participation.
CONCLUSION

California's experiment with electricity deregulation is the most
recent example of the state's willingness to be an energy policy maverick.
But deregulation created a significant regulatory redundancy by giving
both the CPUC and the ISO roles in transmission regulation. This reality
jeopardizes the significant economic, environmental, and reliability
benefits of a robust transmission system. In response, decision-makers
are currently debating two competing proposals to erase this regulatory
overlap. A four factor approach illustrates the strengths and weaknesses
of each proposal much better than looking at a single factor only.
Because the CEC's proposal to centralize transmission planning and
licensing furthers reliability, rate stability, fairness, and to a lesser extent
efficiency, this is the plan California should adopt. And if it does, the
state will move from maverick to mainstream.
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